The paper offers a brief discussion about the role of transport infrastructure in the current growth strategy followed by the EU. As a corridor is the locus where transport infrastructure and growth should interact more effectively, the central part of Corridor V is considered as an interesting case study. A growth scenario for eight countries is provided to show that wide growth disparities are to be expected during the next decade. The final part of the paper speculates about inflation differentials that are likely to emerge when growth differentials tend to persist inside a monetary union. As the Euro zone will be enlarged to host fast-growers in Corridor V such as Slovenia (maybe as soon as 2007), Hungary and the Slovak Republic, growth differentials and the single monetary policy could make it difficult to deliver a common monetary environment.
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Introduction
The EU has a transport policy and the idea of building the TENs is an important aspect of that policy, but in considering the available literature dealing with the relationship between infrastructure investment and growth, one soon realizes that the real impact of that policy is still uncertain. There is, in particular, no certainty about the causal relationship between real growth and public capital investment and the wealth of empirical investigations offered in recent years show that results critically depend on adopted methodologies and geographical scale. Even less is known about the dynamic effects of infrastructure in general and, in particular, along a corridor (Section 2). In a recent European project 1 it has been assumed that the relationship between economic growth and transport infrastructure could be more evident along a corridor such as Corridor V than it would be in general. Section 3 provides a growth scenario for the eight countries (France, Italy, Switzerland, Croatia, Slovenia, Hungary and the Slovak Republic) in the central part of Corridor V. Growth differentials obviously exist across the eight countries, but the structural breaks that have taken place in the Centre East European countries in the last decade spell effects that combine with those produced by public infrastructure capital. To a certain extent, growth differentials are physiological and also useful provided that they make real convergence in per capita income possible.
However, growth differentials could be a problem in the future enlarged Euro zone if they were wide and lasting. Section 4 concludes the article and provides a discussion of the potential inflationary effects of growth disparities in relation to the Euro zone single monetary policy. We assume that in the future enlarged Euro zone, a single money demand will exist and that it will be similar to that of the present twelve members. Under such circumstances, the single wholesale money market for the enlarged Euro zone must be able to channel liquidity efficiently across the different countries, otherwise growth differentials combined with a single monetary policy -however valid it may be in the aggregate -would deliver lasting inflation disparities across member countries.
Infrastructure and growth
The European Union is a two-layer system; the broader layer is formed by a single market with a currency area (ERM-II), while the narrower one is an embedded monetary union (EMU). The basic economic aim of the EU is growth through market integration and cohesion and its most successful initiative has been the single market. The various microeconomic policies implemented since the creation of the single market in 1992 have been largely aimed at removing market distortions, but -de facto -they encapsulate the old common agricultural policy, other cohesion policies and the EMS-II, a currency area. The Euro zone --a true monetary union --pursues macroeconomic stability through the combination of a single monetary policy and surveillance over independent fiscal policies.
Nevertheless, since the inception of the single currency, the Euro zone has experienced a full economic cycle but the monetary union does not seem to have delivered as the cycle has been more painful than the general one.
<<< FIGURE 1 >>>
It is well known that the Euro zone continues to under perform the EU, which, in turn, lags behind America. The gap between the UE and the US has increased over the years and the prevailing opinion is that its origin is in the supply side of the economy (Sapir et al., 2004; Florio, 2005; OECD, 2006 , Scarpetta et al., 2000 .
As the low increase in productivity and in the labour force are seen as the origin of the gap, one could ask whether a lack of infrastructure could have a role in the dismal result. The same issue was famously raised in the US when productivity was in decline there (Aschauer, 1989) and there is a strand of literature focusing the relation between public infrastructure capital and growth (e.g. Gramlich, 1994 , Sturm, 1998 and Ezcurra et al., 2005 . Transport infrastructure, however, has also a political importance.
Since the days of the Roman Empire transport infrastructure has been used to make strategic integration possible, particularly when new peripheries are added to the core. With reference to a large economic entity loosely integrated at its periphery and with large regional disparities such as the Statistical evidence fails to prove this assumption as according the usual criteria the EU and the Euro zone have both underperformed. The most comprehensive explanation of the relatively poor economic performance of the EU has been offered in the Agenda for a Growing Europe (Sapir et al. 2004 ) which helped to focus a fundamental inconsistency between objectives and results. While Europe was providing itself with a large single market, which of course is good for mass industrial and agricultural production, it was undergoing a massively large shift in the composition of demand, production and employment in favour of services. The Agenda draws attention to the fact that in order to flourish growth seems to require more than factor accumulation, imitation, market scale and industry. Indeed, the Authors put forward the view according to which gross capital formation -as the engine of growth --in a mature service economy appears to be less crucial than it is in industrial economies. In particular, when the economy gets closer to the technological frontier, R&D and effective innovation must replace mere imitation in order to keep productivity growing, This means that the most effective policies for the EU are those able to favour the accumulation of knowledge as well as the entry and growth of new producers. In the Agenda for a Growing Europe (Sapir et al., 2004) little attention is given to infrastructure as it is mentioned only as a condition allowing exploitation of the full advantages of the enlarged common market, although it is hypothesized that such advantages are one-shot and thus unable to permanently affect the rate of growth of productivity. In the Agenda it is clearly stated, nonetheless, that priority must be given to community projects instead of national ones and particularly to East-West rather than to North-South connections. The problem at hand is the assessment of the real effectiveness of the infrastructure capital represented by the TENs. Economic research, however, offers little guidance to decision makers as the ultimate dynamic economic effects of network availability and, in particular, those delivered by the reduction in transport costs are uncertain (Gramlich, 1994) . It seems to be really difficult to establish a direct causal relation between the availability of infrastructure capital and the actual economic performance of different countries, regions and metropolitan areas. An entirely different approach to the problem is to measure the correlation between infrastructure investment and growth. One obvious possibility is that public infrastructure capital acts directly on productivity 2 , private investment and growth. At least from Aschauer (1989) and Morrison -Schwartz (1996) it has been argued that after the provision of public capital, producers reduce costs and increase the demand for factors.
The return of existing capital, in particular, increases, thus providing an incentive for further investment. Others have observed that the correlation between growth and infrastructure is spurious as the causal relation goes in both directions. China seems to be a prominent case in point. China started building its infrastructure after the take-off which started in the eighties, i.e. 7 after financial and human resources were raised to the necessary level. It would have been inefficient to start earlier, i.e. during the take-off, and to devote too many of the scarce resources to infrastructure building.
Ultimately, the vast literature offers no guidance as the results seem to depend very much on the methodology used in the assessment. The exiting literature indicates that the relation between infrastructure and economic performance can be assessed both at the national and the regional level (e.g. Ezcurra et al., 2005) . As results differ, we have argued that infrastructure and growth can be seen to interact more effectively along a corridor.
3 National growth scenarios
While being unsure about the real efficacy of promoting growth through public capital, the EU must face significant growth disparities. Besides a predictable and stable component, there is a non-predictable growth component reflecting the non-transitory impact of those shocks, which makes it very difficult to assess the precise characteristics of the trend in any historical series of GDP data. The distinctive and practical feature of the various techniques available is that the analyst must continuously reformulate the forecast to take into account the fact that the growth rate is continuously changing. In our specific case, it was particularly difficult to separate the trend component from the cyclical component, as the available historical series are very short and are very likely to incorporate structural breaks. We believe that an efficient way to forecast growth rates is to consider all the information available. More precisely, we did not, therefore, try to separate them and we merely estimated the constant growth rate n g , for each historical series of length n, satisfying 
The perils of growth disparities in the Euro zone
As explained above, the forecasts were intended to draw a GDP scenario for the countries forming the central part of Corridor V. The methodology adopted offers the advantage of being able to convey at each moment all the information available and, at the same time, to be a very simple way of assessing medium-term potential growth. There is no distinction to be made between trend and cycle to be made, but we know that the trend component implies a given change in the labour force and labour productivity. From the mere economic point of view, the sustainability of the growth process presupposes that infrastructure capital grows at the speed necessary to deliver the necessary increase in labour productivity. Indeed, a shortage of infrastructure is held to impair productivity and growth, even though infrastructure is not a sufficient condition for growth. The EU has given a role to transport, communication and energy networks at the community level on the assumption that not only are they a basic precondition of growth, but that they are also necessary to exploit the advantages of the internal market. Besides harmonization, interoperability, market liberalization and mode rebalancing, the EU has planned to promote supra-national networks.
The forecast shows that growth disparities are likely to appear, at least for a while across the countries that are in the Euro zone and those that, at a certain stage, are expected to become new members. The preceding argument indicates, furthermore, that infrastructure capital or other factors could produce unintended growth disparities across the EU. The very existence of large disparities in per capita income is a problem in itself, but the existence of wide and permanent disparities in the rate of growth inside the Euro zone would be a further problem as it could bear upon inflation differentials. As inflation differentials imply disparities in the real interest rates and the real exchange rates of the different countries inside the Euro zone, the ECB finds it difficult to deliver a single monetary climate across the Euro area. Since the single monetary policy cannot target inflation disparities, the ECB is interested in removing the causes of such disparities.
The ECB apparently holds the view (ECB, 2005) that, to some extent, inflation differentials are desirable as they are the outcome of an equilibrating adjustment process. Inflation differentials, indeed, come in two forms: bad and good. According to the so-called Balassa-Samuelson effect, inflation in a country is proportional to the gap in the productivity growth rates of exportable and non-exportable goods and services. This means that countries that are catching up should experience higher inflation. This is a typical example of good inflation differentials. Besides these differentials, however, there are differentials which are excessive or bad as they appear to be the product of structural inefficiencies, market rigidities and fiscal mismanagement. We observe that both these differentials come from the supply side of the economy. The implementation of a single monetary policy in the enlarged Euro zone would become difficult if the nominal interest rate were to be the same across the different countries while national growth rates were markedly different, as real interest rates and real exchange rates would diverge across the member countries. It comes as no surprise that the ECB is interested in monitoring inflation differentials in order to identify structural barriers that hamper macroeconomic adjustment of the supply side and distort the impact of the single monetary policy . The ECB, however, does not even contemplate the possibility that similar distortion could come from the demand side, and there is a risk that the single monetary policy could add to the mentioned sources of inflation differentials thus not only more making the conduct of monetary policy more difficult, but also making it harder to correctly identify the effective inflationary impact of supply inefficiencies.
There is, indeed, the distinct possibility that a single monetary policy combined with permanent disparities in the rate of growth could become a further source of inflation differentials particularly if the different national monetary markets fail to integrate in a single market. Consider current money demand in the Euro zone. Conventional money demand models assume that real GDP, price level and interest rates are the determinants of money demand and the recent estimates of the euro-wide money demand equation are no exception. Bruggeman et al., 2003 and Brand -Cassola, 2004 , and ECB, 2004 as it is sensible to assume, the spread as a constant, at least in the long run. Following this approach, the growth rates given above for the members of the European monetary union and its future members can thus be readily translated into the inflation rates shown in Table 2 .
<<< TABLE 2 >>>
The state of knowledge about money demand in the Euro area seems to corroborate the existence of a pan-European or single money demand equation more stable than national counterparts (Issing et al., 2001) ; it is, therefore, logically correct to use the single money demand equation for such different entities for which a national real growth rate is estimated. As the Euro money market is formed by the wholesale market (formed by the ECB system and the banks) and the national retail money markets (households and non-bank institutions) there is the need that liquidity spontaneously flows from places where it is abundant to places where it is scarce through the wholesale market. In a really integrated monetary market this should hopefully be the case, but it is not immediately obvious that this really happens in the Euro zone, i.e. that liquidity spontaneously flows from slow growers to fast growers. We know, indeed, that while the single monetary policy has successfully stabilized member countries' inflation rates, a significant degree of country heterogeneity still pervades the Euro area (Busetti et al., 2006) .
As the long run growth rate of the Euro zone in the current way is estimated to be 2.25%, it turns out that Austria, whose estimated growth rate practically coincides with this figure, is bound to have an inflation rate lower than 2% (Table 2) , i.e. perfectly in line with the ECB's definition of price stability. Not so for France and Italy which, by the same token, would permanently be above the target rate. The prospective members of the Euro zone --Hungary, Slovak Republic and Slovenia --have been able to growth faster than the average rate 2.25% and are expected to have a very low or even negative inflation rate. The Slowak Republic and Slovenia, in other words, will have to come to terms with permanent deflationary pressure from the demand side.
In conclusion, the existence of a single monetary policy and a single nominal interest rate will not prevent real interest rates from diverging inside the Euro zone. In the countries where the real growth rate is permanently lower, inflation will be higher (as in France and Italy) and the real interest rate accordingly lower. In countries where real growth is permanently higher (as in the Slovak Republic and Slovenia) inflation will be lower and real interest rates higher. In the enlarged Euro zone, the ECB would probably be forced to revise up the estimated average steady state real growth rate. This should bring about an increase in the target money aggregate growth. Perhaps the parameters of the money demand equation would be changed as well, but the argument above will still apply. Any increase in the dispersion in real growth rates would deliver an increase in the dispersion in inflation rates. The inflation target of the ECB is defined over the whole Euro zone, but the existence of a single money demand and the existence of inflation disparities will not be without consequences: 
